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ABSTRACT
In the event of a chemical terrorist attack on a transportation hub, post-event
remediation and restoration activities necessary to attain unrestricted facility re-
use and re-entry could require hours to multiple days. While restoration time-
frames are dependent on numerous variables, a primary controlling factor is the
level of pre-planning and decision-making completed prior to chemical terrorist
release. What follows is the ﬁrst of a two-part analysis identifying key considera-
tions, critical information, and decision criteria to facilitate post-attack and post-
decontamination consequence management activities. A conceptual site model and
human health–based exposure guidelines are developed and reported as an aid
to site-speciﬁc pre-planning in the current absence of U.S. state or Federal values
designated as compound-speciﬁc remediation or re-entry concentrations, and to
safely expedite facility recovery to full operational status. Chemicals of concern
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include chemical warfare nerve and vesicant agents and the toxic industrial com-
pounds phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, and cyanogen chloride. This work has been
performed as a national case study conducted in partnership with the Los Angeles
International Airport and The Bradley International Terminal. All recommended
guidelines have been selected for consistency with airport scenario release param-
eters of a one-time, short-duration, ﬁnite airborne release from a single source
followed by compound-speciﬁc decontamination.
Key Words: chemical warfare agents, CWA, TIC, terrorism, clearance guidelines
and goals, airport, decision criteria.
INTRODUCTION
This analysis describes a speciﬁc one-time, short-duration, chemical airborne
release attack scenario at a major U.S. airport as a means to demonstrate key as-
sessment considerations and decision criteria that facilitate post-attack and post-
decontamination consequence management activities. This work reﬂects informa-
tion and lessons learned as part of an ongoing U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) domestic preparedness activity. A primary objective of this analy-
sis is to provide and document information for chemical warfare agents (CWAs)
and toxic industrial compounds (TICs) likely to be released in such an incident.
Decision-makers can employ this information to ensure that appropriate health
protective clearance levels are part of any preplanning remediation activities.
A conceptual site model and human health–based exposure guidelines are de-
veloped and reported as an aid to site-speciﬁc pre-planning given the current ab-
sence of U.S. state or Federal values designated as compound-speciﬁc remediation
or re-entry concentrations, and to safely expedite facility recovery to full opera-
tional status. Exposure pathways analyzed include a variety of routes associated
with airborne vapors and potential surface residues such as inhalation and direct
ocular vapor, percutaneous vapor, surface contact, and ingestion. Populations con-
sidered include transit passengers, various airport personnel, and decontamination
personnel.
This work will be presented in two parts: Part I (“Key Assessment Considera-
tions”) characterizes the speciﬁc one-time, short-duration, chemical airborne re-
lease attack scenario at a major U.S. airport that serves as the basis of the evaluation.
Scenario assumptions are described, various post-event phases and timelines are
summarized, and a conceptual site model (CSM) is derived to characterize poten-
tial health risks of concern. Application of the CSM incorporates characterization
of individual threat compounds, identiﬁcation of population(s) of concern, and
determination of likely exposure pathways. Part II (“Decision Criteria for Multi-
pathway Exposure Routes”) presents ﬁrst-time, open-literature documentation of
multi-pathwayandhealth-basedremediationexposureguidelinesforCWAandTICs
(andtheirdegradationproducts)forapplicationtochemicalterroristpre-planning.
Speciﬁcally, the chemical characteristics and population exposure pathways demon-
strated by the CSM in Part I are evaluated against a variety of established toxico-
logically based criteria, most of which have been peer-reviewed and identiﬁed in
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established policies. Where speciﬁc gaps in established criteria for certain path-
ways were found, the authors applied accepted procedures to develop technical
derivations.
Asa riskassessment,this 2-partanalysis focuses ondeveloping an objective hazard
identiﬁcation and characterization approach consistent with the release scenario as
well as scenario-relevant dose response, exposure estimation and risk characteriza-
tion.Itisunderstoodthatriskmanagerswilladditionallyincorporatepolitical,social,
economic, and engineering elements into the clearance decision-making process;
these elements are not examined here. The present work has been prepared to aid
in the making of transparent health-based determinations supported by a robust
foundation of sound toxicological assessment and knowledge of compound-speciﬁc
characteristics.
BACKGROUND
The DHS has been given responsibility to improve domestic preparedness for
potential chemical terrorist release incidents as well as other forms of terrorism
at key U.S. transportation nodes. A multi-year research program involving several
national laboratories as well as subject matter experts from various state and federal
agencieshasbeeninitiatedtofulﬁllDHSChemicalandBiologicalCountermeasures
Program core objectives of (1) minimizing loss of life and economic impact from
chemical attacks and (2) expediting facility recovery to operational status. The fo-
cusoftheChemicalRestorationOperationalTechnologyDemonstrationProjecthas
been on the consequence management phase (e.g., remediation and restoration)
of the response (Table 1); speciﬁcally, effort is directed to pre-plan the recovery
process, select “best available” methods and technologies for each recovery activity,
and address both data and technology gaps critical to the recovery process. Com-
panion work has identiﬁed the importance of preplanning and the fact that some
currently available technologies need further development to better prepare the
Nation (Raber and Kirvel 2008; Raber et al. 2009).
Post-event remediation and restoration activities necessary to attain unrestricted
facility re-use and re-entry could require hours to multiple days. The longer the
time expended in the remediation and restoration phases, the greater the expected
public and economic impacts. While restoration timeframes are dependent on
numerous variables, a primary controlling factor is the level of pre-planning and
decision-making completed prior to chemical terrorist release. By assisting major
transportationnodesandtheirrelatedagenciestomakeadvanceplanningdecisions
in critical areas such as decontamination procedures and clearance goal develop-
ment, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate is enhancing the likelihood
of rapid facility recovery. Minimizing potential economic and public impact from chemical
attacks is an effective countermeasure to chemical terrorism.
This analysis develops and reports critical assumptions, a conceptual site model,
and human health–based exposure guidelines as an aid to site-speciﬁc pre-planning
in preparedness for a chemical terrorist incident. To expedite remediation activities
should such an incident occur, it is important for state and local stakeholders to be-
come familiar with available knowledge and resources in advance so that informed
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risk-based decisions can be made. It is imperative that health-based clearance and
re-occupancy exposure guidelines be incorporated into decision-making as soon as
possible, as such guidance provides the technical basis for design and implementa-
tion of characterization and decontamination tasks; incident on-scene commanders
request and require such guidelines almost immediately after a release incident.
Airport scenario compounds include the CWA nerve agents tabun (GA), sarin
(GB), soman (GD), cyclosarin (GF), and VX as well as the vesicant agent sulfur mus-
tard (HD); and the TIC compounds phosgene (CG), hydrogen cyanide (AC), and
cyanogen chloride (CK) (properties are summarized in Table 2a,b). These 2-letter
codes were originally developed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and are internationally recognized as compound-speciﬁc identiﬁers. Threat analysis
determined that the selected CWAs and TICs were the most likely compounds to be
deployed. Further, their toxicological and chemical properties are considered rep-
resentativeofmanyCWAsandTICsnotspeciﬁcallymentioned.Exposureguidelines
for principal CW agent degradation products of interest (properties summarized in
Table 3) are also provided. Exposure routes considered for this assessment include
those associated with airborne vapors (direct ocular and inhalation vapor, percuta-
neous vapor) and potential surface residues (surface contact with skin, hand-to-eye
transfer, hand-to-mouth ingestion, resuspension inhalation).
Development and application of these health-based guidelines is integral to ful-
ﬁllingDHScountermeasuresprogramobjectivesindetermining“Howcleanisclean
enough?” Answers to that question, as well as the sampling and clearance methods
by which the answer is determined, are key to establishing effective and successful
remediation (Raber and Kirvel 2008; Raber et al. 2009; Hauschild and Lee, 2004;
Watson et al. 2006a,b). Speciﬁc choices are governed by the chemical, physical, and
toxicological properties of the CWA or TIC released; location(s), duration, and
distribution of release; extent of any contamination; characterization of potentially
exposed populations; and principal exposure routes. These parameters would then
become the focus of sampling and assessment during facility remediation activi-
ties. All of these topics are under investigation within this DHS effort, which has
partnered with the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX; Los Angeles, CA) to
generate a national case study.
An overall project objective has been to evaluate existing resources and guidance
so as to efﬁciently leverage known planning and preparedness tools. Therefore, em-
phasis is placed here on exposure guidelines consistent with parameters of the site-
speciﬁcandone-timereleasescenarioforwhichthisprojectisdesigned.Inaddition,
focus is maintained on guidelines that already exist, are published and accessible
to the public, have undergone credible peer and public review, are health-based
and protective, are compound-speciﬁc, and have demonstrated utility in use and
practice. Relevant work is ongoing in many ﬁelds that will continue to inform fu-
ture evolution of clearance guidelines. Nevertheless, if a chemical terrorist incident
should occur tomorrow, it is important to have an available set of appropriate and
reasonable clearance goals from which to begin. It is understood and acknowledged
that each release event will involve site- and incident-speciﬁc parameters requiring
in-context evaluation regarding guideline applicability. Final decisions by appropri-
ate on-scene personnel are expected to reﬂect multiple factors as well as subjective
considerations of risk acceptance and socioeconomic concerns.
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These analyses and evaluations are not intended to be encyclopedic, and the
interested reader is referred to the bibliography for additional background and
speciﬁc documentation of chemical, physical, and toxicological characteristics. Fur-
ther, note that this article does not address public health responses (i.e., medical
treatment) or risk management elements.
PROGRAMMATIC ASSUMPTIONS
Release Scenario
The DHS maintains pre-determined “reference scenarios” for use in homeland
security analysis and planning (Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Pro-
gram; https://hseep.dhs.gov/); these reference scenarios have been established to
facilitatecoordinationandstandardizationamongFederal,state,andlocalorganiza-
tions during planning and exercise efforts. Elements and parameters of a reference
scenario for a plausible indoor chemical attack are the basis for the present evalu-
ation, which is focused on a speciﬁc terminal (the Bradley International Terminal,
or TBIT) within the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). This scenario was de-
liberately designed to illustrate critical decisions and consequences associated with
an indoor attack to a large, high-value, public-use facility.
High-value indoor facilities that provide critical regional services and public ac-
cess to large, dynamic populations are considered plausible terrorist targets. These
facilities also represent some of the most complex technical risk assessment and
political risk management decisions. Therefore application of this type of scenario
for airport preparedness planning is considered broadly beneﬁcial. Further assump-
tions inherent to this analysis include the high likelihood for agent containment in
a conﬁned space, that relatively modest release volumes are necessary to initiate the
chemical terrorist event, and that signiﬁcant regional impact is possible due to facil-
ity use denial. Whereas delivery methods may vary, the single-source, acutely toxic,
short-term airborne release, and dispersion concept is common to many chemical
attack scenarios from other realistic threat assessments (Hauschild and Bratt 2005;
Raber and Kirvel 2008), and was well-documented for the 1995 chemical terrorist
attack on the Tokyo subway system (nerve agent GB; Lillibridge 1995; Komiya and
Kamakura 1995; Tu 2002, 2007; Ember 1995; and others). Volatile airborne releases
typically disperse from the source location via advection and turbulence generated
by facility air ﬂow. Potential cross-contamination from tracking and contact expo-
sure to any liquid hazard are more commonly associated with a limited area of the
facility, especially for chemicals with low vapor pressure (Table 2a,b).
The single indoor release event may be overt and result in immediate signs
and symptoms (e.g., hydrogen cyanide vapor) or covert and initially identiﬁed only
when latent signs are exhibited in exposed populations (e.g., a delayed-onset blister
agent). Fast-acting and acutely toxic compounds that induce signs and symptoms
within seconds or minutes post-exposure are considered plausible threats by both
homeland defense assessments as well as military defense programs (Hauschild and
Bratt 2005; DA 2005a; USACHPPM 2007a,b; Raber and Kirvel 2008).
More speciﬁc assumptions regarding the airport reference scenario that served
as the basis for this assessment are summarized as follows:
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• An undeﬁned quantity of a single chemical of concern is released as a vapor
containing some aerosol from a single clandestine dispersal device in a public
access area of The Bradley International Terminal (TBIT); release duration
terminates within minutes.
• All terminal mechanical ventilation systems were operating as designed at the
time of release and during the release event; operating conditions incorporate
20% outside air and 80% internal recirculated air. Primary distribution of the
released compound is via the mechanical ventilation system.
• Command to shut down the HVAC system was issued approximately 20 min
after incident discovery; completing that action required approximately 60
min. The HVAC system has remained off. All items (e.g., luggage, carry-on
bags, and food) left by passengers and not considered evidence have been left
in place.
• The release device was secured, contained, and removed from the TBIT ap-
proximately 1 hour after incident discovery. Exterior doors of the terminal
were closed by ﬁrst responders after they completed search and evacuation
operations. All subsequent entries during incident investigation were made
through a single entry point equipped with a decontamination station appro-
priately designed and equipped for removal and degradation of the speciﬁc
toxic compound released.
• Subsequent assessment of the release device by appropriate investigative au-
thorities ﬁnds that target compound release was terminated during the ﬁrst-
response phase, obviating the possibility of a continuous and ongoing CWA
or TIC release inside the TBIT. There is no potential for continuous chemical
“replenishment” from an external source into airport atmospheres or onto
airport surfaces.
• No bulk liquid releases or bulk containers of CWAs or TICs are assumed to
be present in the airport terminal, nor is there any assumption of in-terminal
“saturation” releases similar to those found on chemical warfare battleﬁelds.
There is no assumption of other special conditions such as continuous low
temperatures or agent burial belowground that would limit known dissipation
processes of volatilization and hydrolysis.
• Law enforcement personnel and investigative units have completed their tasks
over a period of multiple days, all forensic assessment has been completed,
and the chemical release site has been turned over to remediation personnel.
• During remediation activities, source absence is frequently veriﬁed and vali-
dated by real-time site and personnel monitoring.
• Before unprotected persons are allowed to re-enter and re-occupy the affected
terminal and resume normal activities, all active and passive decontamination
actions are completed, and attainment of clearance concentrations in air and
on surfaces has been certiﬁed by sampling and analysis.
Phases of Response and Recovery
Whiledifferingterminologieshavebeenusedtodescribevariousresponsephases
to a toxic chemical release, this assessment categorizes post-release actions into six
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principal phases (Table 1), beginning with identiﬁcation of an incident (notiﬁ-
cation phase) and ending with veriﬁcation that all cleanup and decontamination
criteria have been met (restoration phase) (Raber et al. 2002). Re-occupancy or
unrestricted re-entry of a site or facility follows completion of ﬁnal restoration phase
activities.Abriefsummaryfollows,andclariﬁeswhereactivitiesanddecisionsrelated
to clearance are most relevant during the remediation process (Raber et al. 2009).
The terminology used is consistent with DHS and U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency(USEPA)documentationpreviouslydevelopedtocharacterizeresponseand
recovery from a biological attack at a major airport (DHS and USEPA 2008), and is
applicable to describe comparable elements of chemical response and recovery.
Notiﬁcation phase. An Emergency Communications Center (such as a police dis-
patchcenter)oranEmergencyOperationsCenter(EOC)receivedknowledgeabout
athreatorareleaseincident.Information-gatheringanddisseminationarethemain
tasks.
First-Response phase. This phase begins with ad hoc response of local emergency
personnelsuchaspoliceandﬁreunits,activationofanIncidentCommandaswellas
law enforcement and emergency operations personnel (e.g., security, medical, and
hazardous materials teams), and establishment of a Uniﬁed Command Structure to
provide integration and risk communication. The First-Response Phase continues
as long as emergency personnel are present. Central activities are rescue and evac-
uation, personal decontamination and treatment, mitigation of any conditions that
pose an immediate threat to human health such as ﬁre or explosion and exposure
to the release, documenting and limiting dispersion of the release (especially any
visible liquid), controlling and securing the release area (a likely crime scene), and
sampling associated with the release area. First responders facilitate evacuation of
the site, search for additional release devices and perform initial sampling to begin
identifying the released chemical(s) of concern. The release site may also undergo
initial stabilization by containment, source reduction, or both so as to reduce disper-
sionandmaterialsorptionaswellastocontrolpotentialforsecondarydistributionor
contamination.Theﬁrst-responsephaseendswhenconditionsdangeroustohuman
health are controlled and when law enforcement agencies complete all necessary
forensic examination (e.g., control of the scene is returned to facility authorities and
remediation personnel).
Characterization phase. This phase encompasses the gathering of information
needed for subsequent activities, including obtaining positive conﬁrmation of the
chemical(s) of concern with veriﬁable protocols (if not performed during ﬁrst
response). Characterization sampling determines extent of any contamination as
well as identiﬁes areas and materials that may need remediation procedures (such
as active decontamination). Chemical and physical characteristics of the released
compound (e.g., volatility and solubility) as well as toxicity are evaluated to gauge
potential consequences to exposedhuman populations and the environment as well
as to identify appropriate mitigation. It is usual to set initial clearance goals during
this phase due to their incorporation into subsequent actions such as sample design
and decontamination method(s) selection.
Decontamination phase. During this phase, plans are implemented to decontam-
inate affected areas and materials so as to achieve clearance goals; additional ac-
tions are often taken to further stabilize or contain released source material. Early
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decontamination actions during the Characterization Phase may commence when
such actions can reduce or eliminate area or source contamination that could lead
to secondary transfer or surface and material sorption. Options for CWA and TIC
decontamination in place include monitored natural attenuation (i.e., weathering),
application of surface decontaminants such as bleach, and gas- or vapor-phase de-
contamination with hot air or a mixture of reactive compounds (Ho et al. 2006;
Talmage et al. 2007a,b). Decontamination terminates when treatment solutions and
foams, if any, are removed or neutralized and all decontamination activities (in-
cluding waste disposal) are complete. Note that, if wastes are held exterior to the
affected building or facility, the Clearance Phase may begin prior to completion of
waste disposal. Veriﬁcation is performed to determine overall effectiveness of the
decontamination technology applied.
Clearance phase. After decontamination is complete, focus is on determining
any remaining human health risk associated with reoccupying the facility and re-
establishing operations. Appropriate personnel review and evaluate relevant data,
such as characterization and clearance sampling results as well as decontamina-
tion process parameters and quality assurance/quality control information. Speciﬁc
clearancecriteriaareappliedtonotonlyjudgeeffectiveness ofthedecontamination
processbuttoalsodeterminewhetherunacceptablerisksremaininreoccupyingthe
facility. Final decisions on clearance are generally made at the local and state regula-
tory level with input from appropriate Federal agencies, depending on site-speciﬁc
jurisdictional authority.
Restoration phase. The focus of this phase is on preparing the facility for re-
occupancy. Activities include renovating areas that have been adversely affected
by the chemical attack or necessary decontamination (as chlorine bleach decol-
orization of ﬂoor coverings and upholstery), and addressing any potential need for
post-clearance monitoring.
In general, the Characterization, Decontamination, and Clearance phases con-
stitute the remediation portion of response to a chemical attack (Table 1). The
identiﬁcation of appropriate pre-planning clearance guidelines is central to restora-
tion of all operations and completion of all remediation in an efﬁcient and timely
manner. It is noted that actions associated with the six principal phases do not nec-
essarily occur in strictly sequential order and may be concurrent. Further, various
portions of a facility may be in different phases at the same point in time.
Overalldurationsforcompletionofeachphasevarysubstantially,aresite-speciﬁc,
and can extend from hours to multiple days. For example, within 24 h post-release,
full operation was restored to all three Tokyo subway lines in which nerve agent GB
hadbeenreleasedbychemicalterroristsonMarch20,1995;concurrentremediation
operations allowed full-service restoration on two subway lines within only 10 h post-
release (Komiya and Kamakura 1995; Lillibridge 1995; Tu 2002, 2007; Ember 1995;
Okumuraetal.1996).Followinga70-tonpressurizedliquidchlorinereleasefroman
overturnedtraintankcarinGraniteville,SC,onJanuary6,2005,fullre-occupancyof
all previously evacuated homes and business was completed within 16 d. Concurrent
remediation operations and an integrated decision-making protocol allowed re-
occupancy of certain residences within 6 d post-event (Mitchell et al. 2005).
Whileeachincidentisgovernedbysite-speciﬁcandcompound-speciﬁccharacter-
istics, the duration of restoration timelines is often the result of decisions made and
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actionstakenduringtheCharacterization,Decontamination,andClearancephases.
A primary controlling factor is the level of pre-planning and decision-making com-
pleted prior to chemical terrorist release. Advance planning decisions in critical
areas such as clearance guideline development for use in governing sample design
and selection of analytical procedures can notably reduce actual time expended
during each of the Consequence Management phases, and greatly enhance the
likelihood of rapid facility recovery to full operational status.
The Tokyo and Graniteville, SC, examples illustrate this point. Key contributors
to rapid facility recovery and relatively small number of fatalities in both the Tokyo
and Graniteville incidents were:
• keen situational awareness,
• pre-planning development of decision criteria,
• advance joint exercises,
• involvement and availability of a large, well-trained hazardous materials team
integrated across multiple agencies,
• passive (e.g., non-explosive, non-aerosolized) characteristic of release,
• volatility of chlorine vapor, and
• volatility and impurity of nerve agent GB vapor release.
Conceptual Site Model
Standard protocols for developing a conceptual site model (CSM; ASTM 2008)
were followed in the development of overall Project remediation guidance (Tucker
and Raber 2008). A generic description of the LAX/TBIT airport-speciﬁc CSM
follows:
• In and around the release location, there may be an area of known or assumed
compound-speciﬁc contamination. In this area, characterization sampling is
focused on quickly identifying what types of materials are contaminated, and
by which threat compound.
• Areas where contamination is considered highly likely, but not conﬁrmed, lie
away from the release location. In such areas, sampling is focused on rapidly
conﬁrming and deﬁning extent of any contamination.
• In the next tier, and at some distance further away, are areas that may or may
not be contaminated; the focus here is on rapidly ﬁnding any contamination
if present, and on developing conﬁdence that areas designated as uncontami-
nated are clean.
• Depending on the size and characteristics of a release and the facility layout
and structure, there may be areas relatively distant from the release location
that are plausibly not contaminated at all. Here, the focus in these distant
areas is on generating technical conﬁdence that such areas are, in fact, not
contaminated.
Consequence management strategies outlined in Table 1 are in accordance with the
conceptual model above.
Useful, relevant, logic, and compound-speciﬁc characterization are also pro-
vided in numerous resources available from ASTM (2003) and various U.S. military
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services, particularly the U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive
Medicine (USACHPPM 1999, 2004, 2008; DA 2005a,b; DA 2008). Additional mate-
rials are provided in the links and cited references contained within these resources.
Potentially Exposed Populations
Three principal populations have been considered during development of CWA
and TIC initial clearance goals for the Bradley International Terminal at LAX:
Decontamination personnel—trained personnel speciﬁcally tasked with performing
decontamination of areas, equipment, and furnishings following a CWA or TIC
release. Because of the nature of assigned duties related to speciﬁc chemical haz-
ard characteristics, decontamination personnel represent a temporary occupational
population. These individuals are expected to enter areas and atmospheres where
undiluted CWAs or TICs may be present in unknown or known concentrations. As
a consequence, decontamination personnel perform work in protective clothing
and equipment (and stay time management) suitable for expected CWA or TIC
concentrations encountered, thus reducing their potential exposures to negligible
(or nil) levels. These individuals may also work in areas or atmospheres containing
spent or reactive decontaminant solutions or vapors and their reaction products, for
which appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) is available. Under ﬁeld
operational conditions, PPE breaches are possible and are addressed in this analysis.
Various airport personnel—a broad category including gate agents, baggage han-
dlers, vendors, restoration and recovery personnel performing refurbishment tasks,
and others. Restoration and recovery personnel include individuals that repair,
maintain, or service airport components and facilities (e.g., maintain and restore
power and water infrastructure, repair or replace carpet and furniture). Such in-
dividuals, along with other airport employees and vendors, would begin tasks only
after the release device and chemical of concern are removed and/or neutralized,
decontamination is complete, and monitoring has characterized atmospheres and
surfaces to verify no hazard is present above clearance concentrations. Due to initial
source removal as well as active and passive decontamination and continued CWA
and TIC degradation via well-characterized reactions such as hydrolysis, assump-
tions of potential exposure duration for this population are the same as those for
the general public transit passengers in the terminal, as earlier proposed by Raber
et al. (2001). This exposure assessment is not based solely on the mere presence of
employees in a facility and the frequency and duration of time they will be on duty,
but rather addresses the question of how much and for how long a chemical haz-
ard would be expected to persist given completion of decontamination veriﬁcation,
completion of sampling operations and consequent destruction and dissipation of
aC W Ao rT I C .
Transit passengers—members of the general public (including individuals of all
ages and inﬁrmities) who occupy airport terminals for limited times as they change
ﬂights, collect baggage, and perform other activities common to aircraft passengers.
Thesite-speciﬁcairportreleasescenario,sourcecontainment,anddecontamination
procedures to be implemented make it unlikely that any residual CWA or TIC will
remain as a source of biologically signiﬁcant post-decontamination exposure. How-
ever, sampling assurances and associated clearance health criteria are necessary to
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address public concerns. Therefore, an evaluation of estimated dwell times of transit
passengersinLAXwasconductedandtheresultsemployedasreasonablesurrogates
for protective “exposure” assumptions. Speciﬁcally, domestic and international pas-
senger survey data collected in 2005 from key LAX airport terminals found that
between 80 and 90% of all passengers spent ≤120 min in the most heavily used
LAX terminals (CAM 2005). Although the time needed to undergo airport secu-
rity and screening procedures has changed in the years since 2005, it is considered
reasonable to assume that most passengers spend ≤4 h in terminal transit. Accord-
ingly, two protective assumptions of dwell time and potential exposure duration for
transit passengers were employed in developing passenger exposure assessments
and to allow ﬂexibility by decision-makers: <8h ,a n d>8hb u t<24 h. Dwell time
exposure durations of up to 8 h are considered reasonable to accommodate nearly
all passengers; >8hb u t<24 h durations represent more extreme cases.
Some concern has been expressed that airport employees, personnel, vendors,
and tenants who perform daily duties within an airport facility such as The Bradley
International Terminalshouldnotbeconsideredmembersofthepublicforthe pur-
pose of setting clearance goals. Such concerns center on unsupported assumptions
that employees, vendors, and tenants undergo repeated or continuous long-term,
low-level CWA or TIC exposure for years in a post-attack airport workspace.
Such assumptions do not consider the ﬁnite source term of the one-time release,
known physical and chemical properties such as volatility, crisis management ac-
tivities such as device removal and neutralization, nor decontamination and other
remediation measures required before re-entry by these populations. There is no
expectation that long-term exposures would occur with successful decontamination
of the release, continued CWA and TIC degradation of any residual material over
time via well-characterized reactions such as hydrolysis, and removal of materials
that cannot be effectively decontaminated.
In the resulting absence of a continuous source, post-decontamination airport at-
mospheres are notconsidered comparable tothose found inindustrialchemical set-
tingsinvolvingmanufacture orprocessingofTICsorCWAsinquantityoveryears.As
aconsequence,thespeciﬁcLAXairportterminalchemicalattackscenarioevaluated
does not support a plausible long-term duration hazard (e.g., post-decontamination
workshift  = exposure duration).
ThislogicisconsistentwithexistingassessmentsdevelopedbyCaliforniastatereg-
ulatory authorities to guide remediation of facilities where persistent compounds
have already been released in toxic quantities (Salocks 2009). Former clandestine
methamphetamine production facilities (“labs”) are often characterized by surface
residues (and potential off-gas) of methamphetamine at hazardous levels, and thus
pose a public health clean-up challenge. Recently completed development of a
risk-based cleanup standard for surface methamphetamine residues by the Ofﬁce
of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA; California Environmen-
tal Protection Agency) underwent extensive review before ﬁnalization in February
2009 (Salocks 2007, 2008, 2009). In a manner similar to the present analysis, Salocks
and his colleagues also based their post-remediation exposure assessment on as-
sumptions that former clandestine production facilities have been cleaned to target
remediationstandardsandthatno“reservoirs”ofunremediatedmethamphetamine
remain after completion of decontamination procedures.
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The USEPA (2009a) acknowledges the validity of the California OEHHA health-
based remediation standard for methamphetamine and points out this standard’s
utility for cleanup veriﬁcation by homeowners, contractors, and state legislators.
SomereviewsofSalocks(2009;seereviewsincorporatedintoappendicesofsame)
took issue with the OEHHA assumption that cleanup procedures and processes
were effective and appropriately executed. A reviewer of Salocks (2009) expressed
concern regarding potential remaining “hot spots,” and that target populations
encountering “hot spot” areas could experience elevated exposures. The Salocks
(2009) response pointed out that any “consideration of potential contamination
‘hot spots’ is essentially a ‘what if’ proposal” that “would be a consequence of inade-
quacies in the cleanup process, not a shortcoming of the target cleanup standard.”
Further, Salocks (2009) states that the reviewer’s “conjecture about potential con-
tamination ‘hot spots’ should more rightly be directed toward the cleanup and
veriﬁcation procedures that are needed to demonstrate that a former clandestine
methamphetamine lab meets the proposed target cleanup level and is ﬁt for re-
habitation.”
The current analysis concurs, and determines that the exposure assessment logic
applied by the California Environmental Protection Agency (OEHHA) for guiding
methamphetamine production facility cleanup is also relevant to development of
pre-planning clearance goals for the one-time chemical terrorist release scenario
being assessed here.
Compound Persistence and Decontamination Considerations
Theprimarygoalofdecontaminationistoreduceoreliminateresidualchemicals
that would otherwise persist long enough to pose a health hazard. Since many
speciﬁc details of the release event (release conditions, dissemination, magnitude
and physicochemical characteristics ofrelease, surface composition, etc.)will govern
thepotentialforresidualchemicalhazardpersistence,bothcompound-andrelease-
event characteristics are acknowledged to directly impact selection and application
of the most appropriate decontamination approaches.
While the airport scenario threat compounds are often generally categorized as
“nonpersistent” or “persistent,” these categories were originally established to gen-
erally reﬂect whether a chemical in liquid state has the ability to present a hazard
for 24 h or more (persistent) or whether the liquid state would volatilize and/or
otherwise degrade in minutes to hours (non-persistent) (USACHPPM 2008a). How-
ever, it is understood that ambient conditions and surface interactions can modify
these general categories on a site-speciﬁc basis. For example, at a temperature of
25
◦C, nerve agent GB has been observed to degrade 1500-fold in less than 10 min; at
0
◦C, 1500-fold degradation of agent GB has required 4–5 h (Puzderliski 1980; Small
1984) (DA 2002, 2005a; Sage and Howard 1989; MacNaughton and Brewer 1994;
Munro et al. 1999; Talmage et al. 2007a,b; Sass et al. 1970; Van Kampen et al. 1969,
1970; Watson and Munro 1990). Under operational conditions, it will be essential to
perform direct veriﬁcation of environmental persistence by chemical analysis to as-
sure that complexities of event-speciﬁc conditions are incorporated into the overall
restoration effort. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between the general persistence
category of a compound and the potential persistence of any residual chemical exposure hazard.
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Figure 1. Non-persistentcompound:Decontaminationandclearanceveriﬁcation.
For several compound/release scenario/surface combinations, there is minimal
ornopotentialforaresidualchemicalexposurehazard.Insuchcases,decontamina-
tion may occur passively with time (e.g., degradation in combination with aeration,
often termed “natural attenuation”; Munro et al. 1999), or with application of min-
imal active decontamination. Compound/release scenario/surface combinations
with greater likelihood to result in a persistent residual chemical exposure haz-
ard could require more aggressive active decontamination efforts (e.g., scrubbing
with reactive solutions) (Figures 1 and 2). Other important elements incorporated
into selection and application of decontamination processes and procedures in-
clude stakeholder and public perception of risk, availability and quality of technical
information on potentially hazardous levels and consequent risk, and applicable
regulations.
As part of this DHS effort, experimental studies of CWA persistence in the ab-
sence ofactive decontamination on fourﬁnishmaterials commonly foundin airport
interiors were performed in a closed system for liquid droplet spikes (Figures 3–5;
Love et al. 2009; Love et al. in review). While experimental details can be found
in Love et al. (2009; in review), several ﬁndings are pertinent to consideration of
persistence and are presented here. Spike treatments were single applications of a
1 µl CWA droplet containing either GB (910 µg/droplet), HD (790 µg/droplet),
or VX (990 µg/droplet). This droplet size represents a typical liquid agent droplet
that could be generated by the airport scenario release (ASAE 2009). Since the
persistence of smaller agent droplets or vapors is expected to be less, experimental
ﬁndings characterizing persistence of 1 µl CWA droplets would represent longer
timescales than what is considered likely for smaller droplets and vapors.
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Figure 2. Persistent compound: Decontamination and clearance veriﬁcation.
Materials evaluated included stainless steel, glass, latex-painted wall board, and
vinyltile.Thispersistencestudywasdesignedinparttoidentifymaterialsthatshould
be targeted for application of rigorous, compound-speciﬁc active decontamination,
and containment or potential removal. For this experiment, no active decontam-
ination was performed on any material/agent combination; all agent diminution
observed was due to the action of passive decontamination (natural attenuation)
processes.
Extraction of all CWA from each material sample was performed at various times
post-spike application to quantify the total maximal amount of CWA present in or
on each material. In all cases, agent attenuation was greatest and most rapid from
stainlesssteelandglass,with0percentremainingwithin12hforGBand25hforHD
(Figures 3 and 4). A longer period (between 170–200 h) of natural attenuation was
required to attain 0% remaining for the VX spike on stainless steel and glass (Figure
5). Non-decontaminated liquid agent spikes on the porous and permeable materials
tested (vinyl tile and latex-painted wall board) displayed a longer interval between
spike application and 0% remaining, with precipitous concentration declines by
liquid agents GB (to 0–30% remaining) and HD (to 20–50% remaining) within 50
h (Figures 3 and 4). As expected, natural attenuation (only) to 0% remaining liquid
agent VX on these porous and permeable materials required a longer interval
(weeks; Figure 5). These VX recovery data indicate that, following a liquid VX
release, aggressive decontamination activities and materials should be preferentially
focused on vinyl tile, latex-painted wall board and similar porous and permeable
ﬁnish materials during the decontamination phase that precedes clearance.
While these studies demonstrate that a wide range of liquid CWA persistence
is theoretically possible for various agent/surface combinations in the absence of
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Figure 3. Effects of natural attenuation only (e.g., no active decontamination) on
persistence of liquid GB spike on indoor airport surfaces; 1 µl droplet
(containing 910 µg GB) (Love et al. 2009; Love et al. in review). The
percentofGBremainingisdepictedrelativetotheamountofGBinitially
applied to the surface. (a) Short-term persistence (within 1 week). (b)
Longer-term persistence (within 1 year).
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Figure 4. Effects of natural attenuation only (e.g., no active decontamination) on
persistence of liquid HD spike on indoor airport surfaces; 1 µld r o p l e t
(containing 790 µg HD) (Love et al. 2009; Love et al. in review). The
percent of HD remaining is depicted relative to the amount of HD
initially applied to the surface. (a) Short-term persistence (within 1
week). (b) Longer-term persistence (within 1 year).
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Figure 5. Effects of natural attenuation only (e.g., no active decontamination) on
persistence of liquid VX spike on indoor airport surfaces; 1 µl droplet
(containing 990 µg VX) (Love et al. 2009; Love et al. in review). The
percentofVXremainingisdepictedrelativetotheamountofVXinitially
applied to the surface. (a) Short-term persistence (within 1 week). (b)
Longer-term persistence (within 1 year).
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activedecontamination,itisclearthatCWAconcentrationscontinuetodeclineover
time in all cases. One critical importance of these data is that, with the exception
of VX, the residual chemical exposure hazard posed by liquid droplet (aerosol)
release of CWA may be realistically mitigated by natural attenuation within a 24-h
period. Thus, consideration of continuous and long-term exposure at some constant source
concentration is not supported by these experimental data.
It is also critical to observe that these results illustrate a physicochemical isolation of
CWA in porous and polymeric materials that serves to reduce available chemical hazard by
physically limiting opportunities for potential primary (e.g., surface contact as well
as vapor off-gas inhalation) and secondary exposure while preferentially seques-
tering agent (Figures 3–5). Sequestered agent concentrations continue to decline
over time with natural attenuation; further, sequestration limits potential spread of
contamination and enables targeted application of aggressive and active decontami-
nation procedures and processes (Love et al. 2009; Love et al. in review). Indeed, this
informationisalreadybeingincorporatedintoplanningofscheduledinfrastructure
upgrades at LAX, where impermeable substitutes for vinyl tile, wallboard, and other
porous media are to be installed (DHS 2009b).
The G-series nerve agents as well as hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, and
phosgene are generally considered “nonpersistent” due to their rapid volatilization,
reactivity, and consequent dispersion (Table 2a,b). Therefore these compounds
are unlikely to pose long-term chemical exposure concerns. As a consequence, the
recommended health impact focus for these nonpersistent compounds is on acute
hazard prevention.
In addition, natural attenuation can effectively contribute to hazard reduction
as agent concentrations decline with passage of time via physicochemical mecha-
nisms such as volatilization, advection, and hydrolysis for these nonpersistent com-
pounds (Munro et al 1999; Talmage et al. 2007a, b). Natural attenuation is less
time-consuming and resource-intensive than technology-driven decontamination
methods, and may be sufﬁcient to reduce or eliminate the potential for exposures
of toxicological concern, depending on source strength and composition and char-
acterization of exposed matrices (DA 2002; Ho et al. 2006). Within a risk-based
framework, re-entry and resumption of airport operations could be allowed after
a suitable elapsed time and veriﬁcation that necessary hazard reduction has been
achieved by means of clearance sampling.
Labor- and resource-intensive decontamination processes should be reserved for persistent
chemical hazards. Of the airport scenario threat list compounds, sulfur mustard agent
HD and nerve agent VX (Table 2a) are considered persistent; sulfur mustard due to
its freezing point and low volatility at ambient temperatures (FP of 13–15
◦C, volatil-
ity of 906 mg/m
3 at 25
◦C) and agent VX due to its low volatility (12.6 mg/m
3 at
25
◦C), especially when compared to nerve agent GB (volatility of 1.9 × 10
4 mg/m
3)
(Table 2a). As evidenced in Figures 4b and 5b for HD and VX, and if sufﬁciently
large quantities of liquid chemical agent have been released and deposited on
surfaces, reliance on natural attenuation alone for VX and HD may not be sufﬁ-
cient for a rapid (<24 h) restoration. Nevertheless, even for persistent compounds,
natural attenuation can serve to reduce overall residual chemical agent load re-
quiring active decontamination, and can help eliminate potential for continuous
exposure.
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Table 4. Half-lives of liquid VX and HD in hydrolysis or oxidation solutions with
estimated agent remaining after 48 hour degradation (initial unit
concentration of 1.0 mg/cm
2).
Estimated agent remaining after 48 hr
CWAs in Half-life degradation for an initial unit
solution (minutes) concentration (1.0 mg/cm2)
VX Hydrolysis
1.25M NaOH 1.8a <4.23E-304 (mg VX/cm2)b
0.25M NaOH 10.8a 5.53E-81 (mg VX/cm2)
0.1M NaOH 31a 1.09E-28 (mg VX/cm2)
0.01M NaOH 198a 4.19E-05 (mg VX/cm2)
0.001M NaOH 1248a 2.02E-01 (mg VX/cm2)
Pure Water 3600a 5.74E-01 (mg VX/cm2)
Unbuffered Water 4680c 6.53E-01 (mg VX/cm2)
Sulfur mustard (HD)
Oxidation
>20% H202 ≤2d < 4.23E-304 (mg HD/cm2)b
aYang et al. 1994; bThis value represents limit of software computational capability; actual
value is less; cYang 1999; dWagner and Yang 2002.
Many remediation technologies are speciﬁcally designed to convert persistent compounds
to nonpersistent hazards (DA 2002; Ho 2006). Utilization of active and intensive de-
contamination processes such as application of high-pH solutions accelerates agent
degradation (e.g., half-time of nerve agent GB at pH 10 is on the order of minutes;
KingeryandAllen1995;DA2002);thisreactionwasusedtorapidlyreturntheTokyo
subway infrastructure to service following a chemical terrorist attack with nerve
agent GB in March 1995 (Tu 2002, 2007). More generally, compounds that demon-
strate persistence under certain conditions that minimize volatility, hydrolysis, and
oxidation (e.g., neutral pH or freezing temperatures) may also undergo optimal
degradation when physicochemical conditions are altered to enhance decontami-
nation reactions. For example, at alkaline pH, VX hydrolysis half-times range from
2 min to approximately 3 h (Yang et al. 1993, 1994; Yang 1995, 1999; DA 2005a).
Peroxy hydrolysis of nerve agent VX is particularly swift, and rapidly cleaves the
P-S bond (Yang 1999). Presented in Table 4 are the hydrolysis half-lives of liquid
VX experimentally determined in various NaOH solutions and water by Yang et al.
(1994) and Yang (1999). As an illustrative example, Yang’s half-life determinations
are used to estimate the amount of VX remaining on a surface after 48 h hydrolysis
degradation from an initial unit concentration of 1.0 mg VX/cm
2 for 10 half-lives
and 2 d post-deposition. This degradation analysis is provided in Table 4 and plotted
in Figure 6.
The persistent sulfur mustard agent HD can be effectively oxidized in minutes
(Wagner and Yang 2001, 2002; review by Talmage et al. 2007b). Also presented in
Table 4 is the Wagner and Yang (2002) oxidation half-life of HD in a solution of
H2O2 as well as the calculated amount of HD remaining on a surface after 48 h
oxidation degradation from an initial unit concentration of 1.0 mg HD/cm
2.
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Figure 6. 2-day hydrolysis degradation of liquid VX in NaOH solutions and water
(half-life determinations from experimental data of Yang et al. 1994 and
Yang 1999 applied to a unit concentration).
The information presented in Table 4 and Figure 6 illustrate that multiple
degradation half-lives for persistent agents VX and HD are achieved within a very
short time following application of appropriate decontamination solutions. It is
further illustrated in Figure 6 that NaOH solutions diluted to as low as 0.01 M
can result in more than a 10 half-life reduction from initial concentration in less
than 2 d. As a consequence, this degradation analysis further asserts that assump-
tions of long-term chronic exposure in the post-decontamination environment are
unfounded.
It is important to distinguish between the persistence of a compound and the persistence
of a hazard. By following a systematic logic involving consideration of the
• amount released as well as nature and extent of release,
• decontamination reaction chemistry,
• characterized outcomes of decontamination methods and procedures,
• degradation products,
• media properties, and
• environmental parameters,
an accurate assessment of potential for residual chemical hazard can be obtained.
When a persistent compound can be determined to pose a nonpersistent hazard, the logical and
recommended focus for cleanup activities is to minimize acute hazards. This logic has been
tailored to the LAX scenario in the present analysis.
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Inhalation and Direct Ocular Most Likely Exposure Routes
The National Research Council (NRC), Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC), and numerous investigators familiar with the legacy and battleﬁeld use
ofCWAsandtheirmanufactureagreethatthemostlikelyroutesofchemicalwarfare
agent exposure are inhalation of vapor or aerosol and direct vapor eye (ocular; a lo-
cal exposure) contact (IOM 1993; NRC/COT 2003; DHHS 1988, 2002, 2003, 2004;
Watson and Grifﬁn 1992; Watson et al. 2006a; Munro et al. 1994; Saxena et al. 2008;
and others). Similar logic is found for phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, and cyanogen
chloride (NRC/COT 2002; ACGIH 2003, 2008; AIHA 2007). Thus, the air exposure
pathway is a primary focus for developing clearance and re-occupancy goals for the
scenario compounds.
Potential Surface Contact Exposure
Given the chemical and physical characteristics of the scenario compounds of
concern (Table 2a,b) and the efﬁcacy of compound-speciﬁc decontamination mate-
rials and methods (Ho et al. 2006; Talmage et al. 2007 a,b), it is unlikely that scenario
CWA or TIC residues would exist on surfaces in quantities sufﬁcient to pose a toxi-
cological hazard after source removal and decontamination have been performed.
Nevertheless, and in the absence of any other compound-speciﬁc surface exposure
guidelines applicable to the airport release scenario, a contact hazard analysis has
been performed. At the request of stakeholder communities, the present analysis
has developed protective guidance regarding potential surface residues of the per-
sistent CW agents VX and HD as well as their principal degradation products. The
working assumption is that, in the unlikely event that exposed skin comes in contact
with any residual compound of concern, the residue could be transferred to hands
and subsequently carried to the eyes and mouth (the latter as non-dietary ingestion)
multiple times/day. Resuspension inhalation has also been evaluated.
These Surface Removal Contaminant Levels (SRCLs; mg/cm
2) are unique to
the current assessment and have been calculated to be protective for minimal and
reversible threshold effect development. Model documentation and results are pre-
sented in the companion paper on multi-pathway decision criteria published in this
journal issue.
CWA, TIC, AND DEGRADATION PRODUCT CHARACTERISTICS
Informed decision-making regarding expected exposure routes and other sig-
niﬁcant elements of consequence management will require not only knowledge of
chemical and physical properties and reaction products, but also toxicological prop-
erties. Mechanisms of toxicity, experimental data, and species susceptibility for the
scenario-speciﬁc CWAs and TICs have been thoroughly evaluated elsewhere and in
numerous publications. Examples include Sidell (1997), NRC/COT (1999, 2002,
2003), Papirmeister et al. (1991), IOM (1993), Munro et al. (1994), Bast and Glass
(2009), Young and Bast (2009), Benton et al. (2006a,b), Dabisch et al. (2008a,b),
Watson and Grifﬁn (1992) and Watson et al. (2006a,b). Details are available in these
reviews and the many original studies cited therein. Brief summaries follow.
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Nerve Agents
The nerve agents considered in this study include the G-series agents (GA,
tabun; GB, sarin; GD, soman; and GF, cyclosarin) and nerve agent VX. These com-
pounds are all toxic derivatives of phosphonic acid, containing either a cyanide
(GA), ﬂuoride (GB, GD, and GF), or sulfur (VX) substituent. They are commonly
termed “nerve agents” due to their anticholinesterase properties and effects on the
peripheral and central nervous systems. Anticholinesterase effects of nerve agent
exposure can be characterized as muscarinic, nicotinic, or CNS (central nervous
system). Muscarinic effects occur in the parasympathetic system and, depending on
the amount absorbed, can be expressed as miosis, ciliary spasm, nasal discharge, in-
creasedbronchialsecretion,bronchoconstriction,emesis,abdominalcramps,sweat-
ing, diarrhea, salivation, bradycardia, and hypotension. Nicotinic effects are those
that occur in somatic (skeletal–motor) and sympathetic systems, and can be ex-
pressed as muscle fasciculations and paralysis. At sufﬁcient exposures, CNS effects
may be manifested as confusion, reﬂex loss, anxiety, slurred speech, irritability, for-
getfulness, depression, impaired judgment, fatigue, insomnia, depression of central
respiratorycontrol,anddeath(Somanietal.1992;Sidell1992,1997;SidellandGroff
1974; Opresko et al. 1998; Bakshi et al. 2000; Watson et al. 2006a,b). Low-exposure
effects include miosis, a feeling of “tightness” in the chest, rhinorrhea, and dyspnea
(Dunn and Sidell 1989).
The “G” series military nomenclature used by NATO-member nations has histor-
ically been considered to be an abbreviation for “German,” with the second letter of
the code (A, B, etc.) identifying the order in which the compounds were found and
analytically identiﬁed by Allied forces investigating materials located in captured
German military facilities at the close of World War II (WWII; Sidell 1997). Agent
VX was industrially synthesized in the United Kingdom in the early 1950s. The letter
“V” is a reported reference to venom (Sidell 1997; Robinson 1967).
The G agents are viscous liquids of varying volatility (vapor density relative to air
between 4.86 and 6.33) with faint odors (faintly fruity, spicy, or odor of camphor).
Agent VX is an amber-colored liquid with a vapor density of 9.2 and is consid-
ered odorless. Nerve agent vapors possess little to no olfactory warning properties
(Table 2a).
It is generally considered that the order of decreasing vapor exposure hazard is:
GB > GD > GF > GA >> VX; the acute toxicity of these agents is sufﬁciently high
for the vapors to be rapidly lethal at appropriate concentrations. Agents VX and
GA are expected to also present a contact hazard. The vapor density of agent GF is
between that of agents GA and GD. Agent VX, with a vapor density greater than that
of any the G agent under consideration, is approximately 3 orders of magnitude less
volatile than nerve agent GB (DA 2005a). As a consequence, agent VX is considered
a persistent “terrain-denial” military compound.
All of these nerve agents can be absorbed through the skin. One issue is whether
percutaneous absorption of vapor through intact skin might contribute signiﬁcantly
to exposure. For agent VX, approximately 100 times greater percutaneous vapor
exposure is necessary to attain the same toxic effect as that achieved from inhalation
vapor exposures when mild effects are compared (NRC/COT 1997, 2003; Watson
et al. 2003). Such estimates indicate that the vapor inhalation pathway is much more
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signiﬁcant for induction of toxic effects than the percutaneous vapor pathway. This
general relation holds true for the other nerve agents as well as sulfur mustard
(NRC/COT 1997, 2003; Watson et al. 2003).
Most signs and symptoms of toxic levels of exposure to a nerve agent, by any
route, usually develop within 60 min post-exposure. However, effects are well known
to occur hours after percutaneous exposure (Sidell 1997; Watson et al. 1992) due to
skinabsorption.Ingeneral,thesmallertheexposure,thelongerthetimetoonsetof
symptoms; effects that occur many hours post-exposure are usually nonfatal (Sidell
1997; Watson et al. 1992).
Sulfur Mustard Blister Agent
As a cell poison and alkylating chemical vesicant, sulfur mustard (agent HD)
damages and destroys cells of any epithelial tissue with which it comes in contact.
Depending on the magnitude of the dose received, erythema, blistering, and other
tissue damage can result with increasing dose. Sulfur mustard was developed and
used as a CWA by the armed forces of several nations during World War I (WWI)
and has been deployed in more recent conﬂicts (IOM 1993).
At ambient temperatures greater than the sulfur mustard freezing point of 13
◦
to 14
◦C( 5 5
◦ to 57
◦F), sulfur mustard is an oily liquid heavier than, and sparingly
soluble in, water (relative density of 5.4) (DA 1996; O’Neil et al. 2001; Table 2a).
Because of its low aqueous solubility, bulk quantities of sulfur mustard are resistant
to degradation in the environment. It is sufﬁciently volatile [vapor pressure 0.072-
mm Hg at 20
◦C( 6 8
◦F) and 0.11-mm Hg at 25
◦C( 7 7
◦F)] to produce toxic vapors
when temperatures are greater than the freezing point. At air temperatures ≥32
◦C
(90
◦F), tissue-damaging concentrations can be small as a consequence of the more
rapiddevelopmentofinjurytowarm,moisttissues(WatsonandGrifﬁn1992).Sulfur
mustard has a garlic-like odor, and reported odor thresholds range from 0.15 to 0.6
mg/m
3 (NRC/COT 2003).
Theprincipalmechanismoftoxicityforsulfurmustardisattributedtoitscapacity
as an alkylating agent and consequent ability to react with DNA and RNA, resulting
in disorganization of normal cell function. As a consequence, sulfur mustard is
considered a cell poison. The epithelium is an important target because of the
presence of a proliferating cell layer. Relatively high sulfur mustard concentrations
are required to cause human mortality; “battleﬁeld” concentrations (perhaps in
excess of 1500 mg-min/m
3) during the Iran–Iraq conﬂict of the 1980s resulted in
mortality rates of 1 to 3% among exposed military personnel (Blewett 1986; Dunn
1986). Such mortality rates are similar to those observed during WWI following
battleﬁeld releases (IOM 1993). For the lethality endpoint, mustard agent is much
less potent (by approximately 10
3) than nerve agents under comparable conditions
of exposure (Watson and Grifﬁn 1992).
The alkylating reaction of sulfur mustard with cellular constituents is rapid (i.e.,
cell injury and death occur quickly). Nevertheless, any clinical effects (e.g.,c o n j u n c -
tivitis, eye sensitivity to light, skin burns) do not manifest immediately, but develop
over hours post-exposure. Such latent effects are characteristic of sulfur mustard
exposures (NRC/COT 2003; IOM 1993; Watson and Grifﬁn 1992; Watson et al.
2006a,b).
30 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 17, No. 1, 2011Airport Chemical Terrorist Attack Pre-Planning: Introduction and Key Considerations
Hydrogen Cyanide
At ambient temperature and pressure, hydrogen cyanide (HCN, hydrocyanic
acid, prussic acid, AC) is a colorless gas or liquid with a boiling point of 25.7
◦C
(78.3
◦F) (Table 2b). The bitter-almond odor of HCN is detectable by some, but not
all,individualsat0.90to4.94mg/m
3(0.8to4.4ppm;ATSDR2006).HCNiscurrently
employed in various industrial applications, including fumigation, the production
of certain resin monomers, and mining (NRC/COT 2002; ATSDR 2006); HCN has
also been used for gas-chamber executions in several countries (ATSDR 2006).
Toxic effects to HCN vapor exposures develop swiftly. Biological effects of HCN
result from its ability to rapidly disrupt cellular respiration via inhibition of the
enzyme cytochrome oxidase. A volatile toxin [vapor pressure 630-mm Hg at 20
◦C
(68
◦F)] with a low vapor density (0.94), HCN will volatilize immediately if released
passively from a container or other material. Liquid HCN is extremely unstable, and
if introduced into a facility, will either rapidly volatilize or undergo an exothermic
reaction upon contact with air and decompose by oxidation (NIOSH 2008 a,b;
Aaron 1996).
HCN can be absorbed by inhalation, ingestion, or by dermal contact with either
the vapor or liquid (ATSDR 2006; NIOSH 2008a,b). However, the volatility of HCN,
coupled with the instability of HCN liquid, indicate that inhalation exposure is the
most important exposure route for an airport release scenario.
HCN crosses mucous membranes rapidly, and HCN entry into the bloodstream
after inhalation exposure is nearly instantaneous. Dermal absorption, or absorption
across the epithelia of the gastrointestinal tract, is somewhat slower (ATSDR 2006).
Inhalation exposure to HCN at sufﬁciently high concentrations can lead to death
within minutes. An average fatal concentration of 600 mg/m
3 has been estimated
for a 10-min exposure.
Short-term exposures to lower concentrations (∼2.7 mg/m
3) may induce symp-
toms and signs that include headache, dizziness, confusion, nausea, and vomiting
(NIOSH 2008b). The principal targets of acute high-level inhalation exposure are
the respiratory, central nervous, and cardiovascular systems.
Although HCN can be dermally absorbed in large quantities, available data rarely
distinguish whether exposure was to liquid or vapor HCN. There are reports of men
equipped with “excellent” respiratory protection who incurred toxic exposures to
HCN vapor via dermal absorption across unprotected skin (ATSDR 2006; Drinker
1932). Very high concentrations of HCN vapor (>343,000 mg/m
3) were lethal to
experimental animals exposed over 2% of their bodies (AIHA 1994).
Cyanogen Chloride
Cyanogen chloride (CK) is a colorless gas at ambient conditions [vapor pressure
of 760-mm Hg at its boiling point of 13.8
◦C( 5 6 . 8
◦F)] with a highly irritating odor
and an odor threshold of 1 ppm in air (ATSDR 2006; Table 2b). Cyanogen chloride
is used in various industrial processes and was historically deployed as a military
chemical warfare agent by several nations (ATSDR 2006). A 10-min exposure to
5m g / m
3 has been characterized as intolerable due to odor irritant properties.
Given the physical form of CK, inhalation is the most important route of exposure
for an airport release scenario. If formulated into an aqueous solution, CK can be
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absorbed via ingestion, although there are little toxicological data on the effects of
this route of exposure or time to onset of symptoms. Data characterizing dermal
irritation or dermal absorption of the vapor are not readily available.
Exposuretocyanogenchloridevaporproducesboththeeffectsofcyanidepoison-
ing and symptoms of lung irritation. At low concentrations (∼2.51 to 50.3 mg/m
3)
over brief exposure durations, eye contact produces tearing with spasm and eye-
lid closure. Principal effects on the respiratory tract are pulmonary irritation, with
pulmonary edema developing at exposures between 50 and 300 mg-min/m
3 (AIHA
1998). At greater concentrations, the cyanide (CN
−) moiety inhibits cellular respi-
ration, with a concentration of 120.63 mg/m
3 reportedly fatal to humans after 30
min, and 399.5 mg/m
3 fatal within 10 min (AIHA 1998; Opresko et al. 1998).
Phosgene
Phosgene (CG) is a colorless, reactive gas with a vapor pressure of 1215-mm Hg
at 20
◦C( 6 8
◦F) (USEPA 1986) and a vapor density of 3.4 (Lipsett 1994; Table 2b).
In the United States, phosgene is used to synthesize other chemicals or products
(NRC/COT 2002). Phosgene also has a history of military use as a war gas during
WWI. Phosgene odor (described as resembling new-mown hay) is generally per-
ceived at concentrations >1.67 mg/m
3 and recognized at concentrations >6.25
mg/m
3. Eye, nose, throat, and bronchiolar irritation occur at greater than 12.5
mg/m
3 (AIHA 2002).
Inhalation of phosgene vapor is the primary exposure route for this agent, and
lungs are the principal target organs. Phosgene-related tissue damage is caused
primarily by acylation of tissue macromolecules in the alveolar region of the lung.
Production of HCl from phosgene hydrolysis may also contribute to its toxicity,
particularly when phosgene contacts and dissolves in the aqueous layer of eyes
and mucous membranes. Chronic, low-level inhalation exposure to phosgene can
causepneumonitisandprogresstopulmonaryedema(AIHA2002).Acute,low-level
phosgene exposure (>30 ppm-min, equivalent to >125 mg-min/m
3) can damage
the lung; acute high-concentration exposures (e.g., >150 ppm-min, equivalent to
>625 mg-min/m
3) can lead to irreversible pulmonary damage or death (NRC/COT
2002). Between the time of phosgene exposure and development of pulmonary
edema there is a latent period, ranging from several hours to 24 h; the length of the
latent period is considered inversely proportional to the exposure concentration
(Diller 1978; Frosolono and Pawlowski 1977).
CW Agent Degradation Products
CWA degradation has been previously examined in many studies characterizing
agent fate, and results are compiled in reviews by Munro et al. (1999) and Talmage
et al. (2007a,b), among others. Research is ongoing in this area. Principal degrada-
tion products of the nerve agents and sulfur mustard agent HD have been identiﬁed
on the basis of environmental persistence, toxicity, or both (Talmage et al. 2007a)
and are summarized in Table 3 along with comparisons to other commercial com-
pounds for perspective. Previous analyses indicate that degradation of GA (tabun)
results in no degradation products of potential concern regarding persistence or
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toxicity (Talmage et al. 2007a; Munro et al. 1999). Most CWA degradation products
are water-soluble but exhibit low vapor pressures and are thus of little consequence
as a source of vapor inhalation or ocular exposure. The ingestion of degradation
products is an unlikely possibility under the airport release scenario, but such a
possibility is nonetheless considered for completeness.
Nerve agent degradation products of particular interest are methyl phosphonic
acid (MPA) and S-(diisopropylaminoethyl) methylphosphonothioic acid (EA2192).
Methyl phosphonic acid (CH5O3P; a hydrolysis degradation product of nerve agents
GB, GD, GF, and VX) is a white solid, is stable under a wide variety of environmen-
tal conditions in both soil and water, is relatively non-toxic, and does not pose a
vapor hazard (vapor pressure of 2 × 10
−6 mm Hg; Table 3). As a function of its
environmental stability and low toxicity, MPA possesses considerable forensic value
and was used by police authorities as conclusive evidence to identify sites where
the Aum Shinrikyo cult had either manufactured or tested sarin prior to the cult’s
chemical terrorist release of GB in the Tokyo subway system in 1995 (Tu 2002, 2007;
Crothers et al. 2008). In addition to its forensic value, MPA can also be used as a
well-characterized monitor of the hydrolysis degradation reaction. It is noted that
MPA is sold commercially as an analytical reagent and used in the production of
lubricantadditivesandfortreatingtextiles(Lewisetal.1997;HSDB2008).Isopropyl
methylphosphonic acid (IMPA) and ethyl methylphosphonic acid (EMPA) exhibit
oral toxicity rankings similar to that of MPA (Table 3).
The VX hydrolysis product, EA 2192 (C9H22NPO2S), is produced during VX
hydrolysisreactionsconductedwithinthepHrangeof>6to10(Talmageetal.2007a
and b; Munro et al. 1999). EA 2192 is a white solid, possesses low vapor pressure, is
stable (Michel et al. 1962; Szafraniec et al. 1990), and is water-soluble (Small 1984).
Oral toxicity data for the LD50 endpoint indicates that EA 2192 is approximately
6 times less toxic than the parent agent VX. EA 2192 is not an inhalation hazard
and is not absorbed through the skin in aqueous or alcohol solutions (Michel et al.
1962), but is thought to present a potential but remote ingestion exposure concern.
Since EA 2192 is not signiﬁcantly formed at pH <6o r>10, where the hydrolysis
reaction produces diisopropyl ethyl mercaptoamine and EMPA, it is highly advised
that the pH of the VX decontamination reaction be closely monitored to ensure
maintenance at pH <6o r>10. Production of EA 2192 can also be prevented
by nucleophilic decontamination of VX with excess H2O2 in mildly basic or basic
solutions (Yang 1999). Documented hydrolysis reaction yields of EA 2192 from the
parent VX are less than 25% (Michel et al. 1962; Szafraniec et al. 1990; Yang et al.
1993; Yang 1995), thus further reducing the potential for exposure.
Sulfurmustard(HD) hydrolysisleads to the formation of thiodiglycol (C9H10O2S,
CAS No. 111-48-8) and HCl (Small 1984; Rosenblatt et al. 1995; Munro et al. 1994).
Thiodiglycol (TDG) exhibits a low vapor pressure (2 × 10
−5 mm Hg; Table 3) and
does not present an inhalation hazard; it is miscible in water and oral toxicity is
considered low (rat oral LD50 of 6610 mg TDG/kg and within the oral LD50 range
for saccharin; Table 3). The environmental stability of TDG can allow forensic
monitoring to ascertain potential use or previous presence of HD; for example,
TDG was present among compounds identiﬁed in soil, munition fragments and
wool samples associated with a CWA release in Iraq (Talmage et al. 2007; Hay and
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Roberts 1990; Black et al. 1993). Nevertheless, it is noted that the presence of TDG is
not a unique forensic identiﬁer given that thiodiglycol is a high-production volume
chemical used commercially in the U.S. textile industry (Talmage et al. 2007).
Incomplete oxidation or incomplete dechlorination during decontamination
of sulfur mustard vesicant agent (HD) could lead to the generation of the tran-
sient toxic intermediate reaction products mustard sulfone (C4H8SO2Cl2,C A SN o .
471-03-4; a product of incomplete oxidation reaction with supertropical bleach) or
divinyl sulfone (C4H6SO2; CAS No. 77-77-0; an intermediate product of HD dechlo-
rination) (Small 1984; Munro et al. 1999). These compounds are volatile and are
not considered persistent. Photochemical oxidation of divinyl sulfone occurs within
hours, and volatilization from potentially contaminated soil or water is signiﬁcant.
Divinyl sulfone is not unique to HD decontamination and is produced commer-
cially and used during processing of cotton textiles (HSDB 2008). Production of,
and potential exposure to, these sulfone intermediates under the airport scenario
can be prevented by monitoring the oxidation and dechlorination of HD so that
decontamination reactions go to completion.
PRECEDENTS AND SOURCES OF EXPOSURE GUIDELINES
ExposureguidelineshavebeenimplementedformanydomesticsiteswhereCWAs
are present. The current analysis explores and evaluates available approaches to de-
velop guidelines suitable for remediation pre-planning under the airport chemical
terrorist scenario described above.
Agencies and Authorities
Many agencies have developed multiple exposure guidelines for CWA and TICs.
Each agency incorporates its own unique set of exposure assumptions (e.g.,e x p o -
sure duration) and population characteristics, and a working knowledge of these
assumptions is critical in selecting appropriate guidelines for facility remediation.
In addition, values may sometimes need to be extrapolated when experimental
data are lacking or unavailable. Well-informed decision-making includes familiarity
with the literature as not all of the published guidelines are suitable for developing
clearance goals for the airport chemical terrorist scenario and populations under
consideration.
Primary exposure routes of concern for various airport personnel as well as tran-
sit passengers are direct vapor exposures to the eyes and tissues surrounding the
eyes (ocular exposure) or direct vapor exposures to the respiratory tract (combined
as the inhalation and ocular routes). The literature considers absorption of CWA
vapors through the skin (percutaneous exposure) to be of secondary importance.
For rapidly reactive materials such as nerve agents and sulfur mustard, tissues of
the eye and upper respiratory tract would be the ﬁrst to exhibit effects. The eyes
and respiratory tract would also be the ﬁrst tissues to exhibit the effects of CK and
phosgene exposure. Whereas HCN can also affect the respiratory tract, signs and
symptoms of HCN effects arise from disruption in oxygen transport to critical tissues
such as the brain, and would likely dominate. Designation of ocular and inhalation
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vapor exposure as the primary exposure routes of concern is protective and consis-
tent with previous emergency preparedness decisions made by the DHHS (1988),
CSEPP (2003), NRC/COT (2001, 2002, 2003), DA (2004, 2008), and others. In
addition, selection of these primary exposure routes is also based on the chemical
and physical properties of the scenario compounds as well as historical data on case
exposure.
TheCWAhealth-basedriskinformationusedaspartofthisevaluationwasinitially
developed to facilitate disposal of the U.S. stockpile of CWA munitions, maintain
U.S. treaty compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, and to support
remediation or closure at sites where CWAs were historically processed. Existing
CWA guidelines and updates have received new interest for homeland defense
applicationssincetheeventsofSeptember2001.Amongtheauthoritiesandagencies
that have published guidelines for threat CWAs and TICs considered in evaluation
of the airport chemical terrorist scenario are the following:
• Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (ATSDR 2003, 2005, 2006)
• American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH 2003,
2008)
• American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA 2007)
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS 1988, 2002, 2003, 2004)
• Committee on Toxicology of the National Research Council (NRC/COT 2001,
2002, 2003)
• National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (NIOSH/CDC 2008; NIOSH
2008a,b)
• Regional Screening Levels (RSLs) for Chemical Contaminants at Superfund
sites (USEPA 2008, 2009b)
• U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACH-
PPM) (USACHPPM 1999, 2004, 2008; OASA 1999).
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA 1991, 1996b)
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Integrated Risk Information System
(USEPA/IRIS 2005, 2006a,b)
• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Regions 9 and 3 (USEPA 1996a; 2005)
Whereas site-, situation-, compound-, and population-speciﬁc factors should all be
considered when selecting acceptable clearance goals for toxic chemicals, various
scientiﬁcally defensible concentrations have been applied as decision criteria for
several CWAs and TICs. Development of decision criteria for the current assessment
includes evaluation of these existing precedents, which are discussed below.
CWAs and the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
(8 Host States)
At present, there are six military sites within the continental United States
(Alabama, Arkansas,Colorado, Kentucky, Oregon, and Utah) where domestic stock-
piles of obsolete CWA munitions are stored and secured (as of January 2009, the
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historical sulfur mustard munition stockpile at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; as
well as the WWII-era nerve agent VX munition stockpile at the Newport Chemical
Depot, IN, have been fully and successfully demilitarized) (CMA 2009; Watson et al.
2006a). These stockpiles of nerve and sulfur mustard CWAs were originally devel-
oped as a Cold War deterrent, and have been undergoing destructive disposal in
compliance with international treaty (the Chemical Weapons Convention; website
of Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at www.opcw.org). The
U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) oversees disposal of the U.S. stockpile
and routinely publishes updates on the status at each site (www.cma.army.mil). One
of the areas receiving signiﬁcant attention during demilitarization development was
evaluation of procedures to address a potential accidental agent release during the
destruction process; stockpile agent destruction was not permitted by host states un-
til emergency response decision criteria and procedures were considered adequate.
The Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) was estab-
lished during the 1990s to ensure the appropriateness of emergency response pro-
cedures and resources (models, policies and guidelines, training, etc.) at each of
the stockpile sites. The CSEPP is a joint activity overseen by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of the Army (DA) (through the
CMA) and is integrated with state and local decision-makers and agencies (Carnes
1989).
Worst-case release preparedness
A primary decision-making tool of the CSEPP program is air dispersion model
development and implementation, in which hypothetical CWA releases are virtually
distributed on the basis of site meteorology and reasonable worst-case site-speciﬁc
release scenarios. The model runs are used to “test” safety plans and to determine
resource needs for host areas adjacent to stockpile locations. Model results are also
employed to compare plans and needs at multiple geographic and administrative
scales (e.g., town, county, and metropolitan areas.).
Initially, CSEPP chemical warfare agent dispersion plume models incorporated
agent toxicity values originally designed as simplistic casualty estimators for battle-
ﬁeld scenarios involving young male soldiers. Various assessments of agent toxicity
values since that time demonstrated a need to re-evaluate the acute toxicity of these
agents and their effects on a more diverse population, and to address the role
of different concentrations and exposure durations (NRC/COT 1997; USACHPPM
2004).ItwaswidelyrecognizedwithinCSEPPthatoneofthemostrelevantprograms
addressing hazardous material exposure assumptions appropriate for civilian popu-
lations was that of the USEPA Ofﬁce of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances
(OPPTS).TheOPPTShascollaboratedsince1995withtheNationalResearchCoun-
cil Committee on Toxicology to develop Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs)
for numerous hazardous compounds, including most of the chemicals evaluated for
the airport chemical terrorist scenario.
Toaddresspublicconcernsregardingpreviousacuteexposurecriteria,theCSEPP
evaluated AEGLs as decision criteria for CWA emergency preparedness and plan-
ning. The transparent AEGL process was a modern and more systematic approach
36 Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 17, No. 1, 2011Airport Chemical Terrorist Attack Pre-Planning: Introduction and Key Considerations
than previous internal military technical reports, and the established National Re-
search Council (NRC) review process ensures appropriate scientiﬁc credibility and
peer review (NRC/COT 2001). Perhaps most importantly, the availability of CWA-
speciﬁcAEGLsallowsconsistencywithcriteriaandproceduresusedbyotherFederal,
state, local, and industry entities in emergency planning and response to releases of
TICs. For example, industrial facilities conduct plume modeling of plausible release
scenarios and estimate possible exposures to civilian populations as part of Risk
Management Plan (RMP) development.
AEGLs (expressed in mg/m
3 or ppm) are exposure limits for the general public
that are designed to aid state and local government agencies in developing response
plans in the event of accidental or deliberate atmospheric release of extremely
hazardous chemical substances. AEGL values for vapors of numerous hazardous
compounds (including HCN, phosgene, nerve agents, and vesicant agent HD) have
been published by the National Academy Press (NRC/COT 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004,
2007, 2008); others are in various stages of review. For each hazardous compound,
guidelinelevelsaredevelopedforcontinuousvaporexposuredurationsof10and30
min; 1, 4, and 8 h; as well as for three gradations of toxic effect severity. AEGL-1 con-
centrations are the mildest effect category, while AEGL-3 concentrations represent
the most severe effect category (NRC/COT 2001).
In actual practice, and depending on the degree of conservatism incorporated
during review of individual hazardous compounds subjected to the AEGL process,
the AEGL concentration set for any given effect level (AEGL-1, 2, or 3) is protective
and is often established at a concentration that is much less than the known, exper-
imental concentrations at which such “tier” toxicological effects are observed. Such
is the case for the CWAs and TICs evaluated in the present assessment (NRC/COT
2002, 2003; Watson et al. 2006a,b).
Theorganizationsthatdevelop,review,andpublishAEGLvaluestakenoposition
onhowcompound-speciﬁcAEGLconcentrations aretobeapplied(ornotapplied).
The Standing Operating Procedures for Developing Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for
Hazardous Chemicals developed by the USEPA National Advisory Committee and
the Committee on Toxicology of the National Research Council (NRC/COT 2001)
states: “Because of the complex nature of chemical accidents . .. and many other
considerations related to a speciﬁc event, it is beyond the scope of this [Standing
Operating Procedures] document to discuss or speculate on speciﬁc actions that
should or could be taken at any point in time or to a given level of exposure
to a speciﬁc chemical. However, emergency responders and planners know that
various options are available, depending upon the circumstances, for reducing or
even preventing the adverse impacts of chemical releases. .. . Decisions on these
options are important and are best left to local emergency planners and responders
to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.”
The utility of AEGL values for CWA emergency preparedness planning was fur-
ther recognized when FEMA and U.S. Army representatives adopted ﬁnal nerve
and sulfur mustard agent AEGL concentrations to replace pre-2000 agent casualty
estimators with updated toxicity criteria for emergency response decision-making
in the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP 2003). This
adoption is in furtherance of U.S. compliance with international treaty obligations
under the Chemical Weapons Convention, which mandates destruction of the U.S.
Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 17, No. 1, 2011 37A. Watson et al.
chemical weapons stockpile. Since February 2003, standing CSEPP policy guidance
foreachoftheseveralcommunitiescurrentlyhostingCWAdemilitarizationfacilities
in the U.S. recommends application of agent-speciﬁc AEGL-2 concentrations as the
protective action level for evacuation or shelter-in-place decisions, AEGL-1 concen-
trationsasnotiﬁcationlevelswithnoprotectiveaction,and<AEGL-1concentrations
as requiring no protective action or notiﬁcation (CSEPP 2003). Since publication of
ﬁnal AEGL levels by NRC/COT (2003) and enactment of the above CSEPP Policy
Paper (CSEPP 2003), multiple stockpile host states, counties, and municipalities
have incorporated the Policy Paper recommendations into their individual com-
munity emergency response plans and have employed them in making regulatory
decisions permitting CWA munition disposal operations (CSEPP 2006a,b).
The LAX site-speciﬁc scenario incorporates many of the same elements as those
included in CSEPP emergency preparedness scenarios (e.g., one-time release of lim-
ited duration, dispersion and dissipation consistent with known compound-speciﬁc
chemical and physical characteristics). As a consequence, the LAX scenario sup-
ports consideration of short-term vapor exposure duration for pre-planning clear-
ance goal selection. Analyses of short-term as well as routine-exposure scenarios
suitable for a CW agent-processing facility are provided below for comparison and
completeness.
Agent workers in CWA demilitarization facilities: routine operations and assumed
potential daily exposures
TheCentersforDiseaseControlandPrevention(CDC)(DHHS1988,2002,2003,
2004) has published chronic industrial exposure guidelines for assumed daily ex-
posures during multiple years of routine CWA demilitarization facility operations
managed under the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CW
agents GA, GB, VX, and sulfur mustard). Following similar logic, the Department of
the Army, Ofﬁce of the Surgeon General has developed chronic industrial exposure
guidelines for nerve agents GD and GF (DA 2004). These “agent worker” exposure
limitsaddressexposure-speciﬁcscenariostailoredforapplicationtotrainedandspe-
cialized CW agent workers outﬁtted with agent-protective equipment and employed
within CSEPP demilitarization facilities. These agent exposure limits have not been
authorized by the CDC for application to any other purpose or population.
Worker Population Limit (WPL)—a time-weighted average for a conventional 8−h
workdayanda40-hweek.TheWPLrepresentsaconcentrationtowhichitisbelieved
that virtually all agent demilitarization facility workers may be repeatedly exposed,
day after day, without adverse effect (DHHS 2002). The CDC assumed continuous
exposure conditions equal to that of a stationary worker at the same duty station
for the entire shift/work week/work year for multiple years, with ﬁxed atmospheric
stability, no ventilation rate change, and no agent degradation (DHHS 2002, 2003,
2004). The CDC acknowledges that these demilitarization facility personnel expo-
sure assumptions are unrealistic. Current compound-speciﬁc WPL concentrations
are 3 × 10
−5 mg/m
3 for GA, GB, GD, and GF (DHHS 2003; DA 2004), 1 × 10
−6
mg/m
3 for VX (DHHS 2003), and 4 × 10
−4 mg/m
3 for HD (DHHS 2004).
Short-Term Exposure Limit (STEL)—conventional 8-h workday and 40-h week “ex-
posures greater than the WPL up to the STEL should not be longer than 15 min
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and should not occur more than 4 times per day, and there should be at least 60
min between successive exposures in this range” (DHHS 2002). The CDC considers
agent VX to be a special case and advises that excursions to the VX STEL “should
not occur more than once per day” (DHHS 2003). For STEL estimations, the CDC
also applies the same continuous and unrealistic exposure assumptions as outlined
above for the WPL (DHHS 2002, 2003, 2004). Current compound-speciﬁc STEL
concentrations are 1 × 10
−4 mg/m
3 for GA and GB (DHHS 2003), 5 × 10
−5 mg/m
3
for GD and GF (DA 2004), 1 × 10
−5 mg/m
3 for VX (DHHS 2003), and 3 × 10
−3
mg/m
3 for HD (DHHS 2004).
Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH)—the averaging time for IDLH con-
centrationsis30min(DHHS2003,2004)andwasestablishedtoboundtheexpected
concentration from which chemical warfare agent demilitarization facility workers
could safely escape within 30 min and without respiratory protection in the event
of an emergency situation. Near-real-time monitoring is recommended. Current
compound-speciﬁc IDLH concentrations are 0.1 mg/m
3 for GA and GB (DHHS
2003), 0.05 mg/m
3 for GD and GF (DA 2004), 0.003 mg/m
3 for VX (DHHS 2003),
and 0.7 mg/m
3 for HD (DHHS 2004).
Exposure assumptions employed by the CDC during development of agent-
speciﬁc WPLs and STELs were deliberately designed to guide routine work pro-
cesses in chemical warfare agent demilitarization facilities or transport operations
wherelargequantitiesofmilitary-gradeandundilutedCWAandCWAmunitionsare
handled and processed daily. Under these speciﬁc occupational settings, the CDC
assumed an existing potential for chronic exposures from a continuous source (e.g.,
the unitary munition stockpile which contains “leakers”) (DHHS 1988, 2002, 2003,
2004). As outlined above, the CDC exposure assumptions include 8 h/d, 5 d/wk,
continuous CWA exposure for multiple years (e.g., the life of each agent-speciﬁc
demilitarization operation), and are thus not realistic or in keeping with the airport
remediation scenario under consideration (e.g., one-time only release followed by
source removal and decontamination). As a consequence, the CDC WPL and STEL
estimates are not recommended for use in evaluating airport site-speciﬁc popula-
tions such as airport employees and vendors; the post-decontamination airport is
not comparable to an industrial chemical setting in which CWA processing takes
place over an extended duration. Assumptions embedded in the IDLH derivation
are considered appropriate for potential application to airport decontamination
personnel.
Host communities for CWA demilitarization facilities: routine operations
and assumed potential daily exposures
The CDC (DHHS 1988, 2002, 2003, 2004) has also published CWA chronic gen-
eral population exposure limits (GPLs) for residents of host communities adjacent
to operating CW agent demilitarization facilities. The GPLs are deﬁned as “the
maximum concentration to which members of the general population may be con-
tinually exposed 24 hr a day, 7 days per week,” for a continuous period of years
without adverse health effects (GPL concentrations are 1 × 10
−6 mg/m
3 for GA,
GB, GD, and GF; 6 × 10
−7 mg/m
3 for VX; and 2 × 10
−5 mg/m
3 f o rH D ) .T h eC D C
further assumes that members of the host community general public are completely
Hum. Ecol. Risk Assess. Vol. 17, No. 1, 2011 39A. Watson et al.
stationary for a period of years; that atmospheric stability, wind speed and direction
are ﬁxed; and that no agent diminution results from environmental degradation,
rainfall dilution, and changes in meteorology (DHHS 2002, 2003, 2004). The CDC
acknowledges that these exposure assumptions are unrealistic (DHHS 2002, 2003,
2004), and warns that these limits are not authorized for application to any other
purpose or population other than the speciﬁc CWA unitary stockpile demilitariza-
tion mission. As a consequence, CDC GPL concentrations are not appropriate for
application to any members of the airport scenario general public, including tran-
sit passengers, airport employees, vendors, and so on and are provided here for
completeness.
Spring Valley Formerly Used Defense Site (SVFUDS; Washington, DC)
The Spring Valley Formerly Used Defense Site (SVFUDS) is the location of a
WWI-era chemical munitions testing facility. Once remote, the SVFUDS has been
surrounded by urban sprawl and is now located within the metropolitan District of
Columbia (http://www.nab.usace.army.mil/projects/WashingtonDC/springvalley.
htm). The SVFUDS area is surrounded by residential development that contains
approximately 1500 homes, numerous embassies and ofﬁcial residences, medical
facilities, portions of the American University campus, and commercial shops. The
currentphaseofremediationactionforburiedWWI-erachemicalmunitions(largely
75 mm chemical projectiles containing either sulfur mustard agent or arsine) was
initiated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 2007 and is ongoing in the midst of
continuing host community life (Drogin 2010; Zongkar 2010). Civilian (USEPA Re-
gion III and the Government of the District of Columbia, including D.C. police and
ﬁre departments) and military authorities responsible for the Spring Valley site have
determined that no protective action is required for exposures to vapor concentra-
tions less than the 10-min AEGL-2 values for sulfur mustard and arsine (U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers Baltimore District 2007; PARSONS 2007; DDESB 2008). These
authorities consider the toxicity endpoints and uncertainty factors applied during
development of arsine and sulfur mustard AEGL-2 concentrations to be protective
(NRC/COT 2000, 2003; Watson et al. 2006a).
To bound SVFUDS work zones and develop contingency plans, Maximum Cred-
ible Event (MCE) analyses have been performed with the aid of plume dispersion
models incorporating worst-case and site-speciﬁc meteorology and topography in-
puts. The Spring Valley MCE has focused on instantaneous release of the entire
payload of a chemical projectile (e.g., 1.2 lb arsine or 1.35 lb sulfur mustard), with
that entire payload present in the plume (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Balti-
more District 2007). The pace and nature of each day’s work are determined by
periodic calculations of downwind AEGL-2 distance for the speciﬁc agent, MCE,
weather and task, and modiﬁed accordingly. Maximal downwind hazard distances
under worst-case conditions at the Spring Valley site are 742 ft (arsine) and 240
ft (sulfur mustard) (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Baltimore District 2007). The
protective planning decision made by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in collabo-
ration with their civilian-authority partners and stakeholders has been to apply the
(greater) arsine-speciﬁc downwind hazard distance for operations involving either
sulfur mustard or arsine munitions.
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Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC)
ApplicationofAEGLconcentrationsisincorporatedintoFederaldispersionmod-
eling and hazard prediction products developed by the Interagency Modeling and
Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC) in generating atmospheric assessments
and downwind hazard distance predictions for application during an Incident of
National Signiﬁcance (see links at https://narac.llnl.gov). The AEGL tier concen-
trations for G-series nerve agents, nerve agent VX and vesicant agent HD as well
as several TICs are embedded within multiple atmospheric models maintained by
IMAACasconsequencemanagementtoolsforusertraining,supporttotheNational
Exercise Program (NEP) and speciﬁc exercises such as the TOPOFF series, as well as
operational incident support for commercial hazard assessment (Dillon et al. 2004;
Sugiyama and Nasstrom 2006). In addition, IMAAC tools and products are made
available at National Special Security Events (NSSEs).
At present, the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL, Livermore, CA) is the IMAAC
product provider.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
Emergency Response Safety and Health Database (ERSHDB)
Acceptable criteria for “Green Zone” (Level D) declaration includes attainment
of less than (compound-speciﬁc) AEGL-1 vapor concentrations. Level D is the min-
imal personal protective equipment (PPE) selection tier established by NIOSH and
consists of “coveralls or other work clothes, boots, and gloves.” No respiratory pro-
tection is required at Level D, which can be declared “when the contaminant and
concentration of the contaminant are known and the concentration is . .. less than”
theAEGL-1forthestateddurationtimes”(www.cdc.gov/niosh/ershdb;lastaccessed
January 24, 2011).
Military Missions
Other AEGL applications include use as hazard assessment plume modeling cri-
teriafortheU.S.Non-StockpileChemicalMaterielProgramandHomelandDefense
scenarios, as detection performance goals for advanced equipment acquisition and
development, and as a tool for assessing potential exposures during military mis-
sions, such as peacekeeping (Watson et al. 2006a,b; USACHPPM 2008b).
CONCLUSIONS
A national case study sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security in
partnership with The Bradley International Terminal (TBIT) at the Los Angeles
InternationalAirport(LAX)hasbeenperformedtodevelopexposureguidanceand
pre-planning clearance concentrations for use in the event of a chemical terrorist
incident.
The availability of pre-planning clearance concentrations for multiple exposure
mediaisakeycomponenttoimplementingeffectiveandrapidremediationdecision-
making that safely minimizes down time and potential economic impact for a major
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airport. Since minimizing potential public and economic impact from chemical
attack is an effective countermeasure to chemical terrorism, publication of these
values and their logic for pre-planning application in advance of a release event
facilitates such counter-terrorism activity.
Published together for the ﬁrst time are descriptions of attack scenarios, charac-
terization of potentially exposed populations, timelines of various post-event phases,
risk assessment logic, assessment of threat compounds and their principal degrada-
tionproducts,characterizationofcompoundpersistenceanddecontamination,and
precedents for utility and application to the attack scenario under consideration. In
addition, a conceptual site model (CSM) is derived to characterize potential health
risks of concern.
Chemical and physical properties of each threat compound (the CWA G-series
nerve agents and nerve agent VX as well as the vesicant agent sulfur mustard; the
TIC compounds phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, and cyanogen chloride) as well as
principal CWA degradation products are summarized (Tables 2 and 3) to meet
stakeholder needs for information access during remediation pre-planning. Toxi-
cological characteristics are summarized in text sections outlining “CWA, TIC, and
Degradation Product Characteristics.”
Atfurtherstakeholderrequest,realisticcharacterizationofpost-decontamination
exposure durations was developed and presented from literature characterizing
agent decontamination (Yang et al. 1994; Yang 1999; Wagner and Yang 2002),
risk-based cleanup guidelines published by the California Environmental Protec-
tion Agency for the persistent compound methamphetamine (Salocks 2009; USEPA
2009a), and evaluation of recent experimental studies characterizing CWA liquid
droplet persistence on four ﬁnish materials (Love et al. 2009; Love et al. in review)
(Table 4; Figures 3–5, Figure 6).
These experimental data were collected in the absence of active decontamina-
tion and thus represent a worst case. CWA agent attenuation is greatest and most
rapid from stainless steel and glass, while droplet spikes on the porous and per-
meable materials tested (vinyl tile and latex-painted wall board) displayed a longer
interval between spike application and full attenuation. Precipitous concentration
declines by GB and HD occurred within 50 h post-spike (Love et al. 2009; Love
et al. in review). As expected, natural attenuation of liquid agent VX on these porous
and permeable materials required a longer interval. It is clear that CWA concen-
trations continue to decline over time in all cases, and, with the exception of VX,
the residual chemical exposure hazard posed by liquid droplet (aerosol) release
of CWA may be realistically mitigated by natural attenuation within a 24-h period.
Further, the physicochemical isolation of CWA in porous and polymeric materi-
als serves to reduce available chemical hazard by physically limiting opportuni-
ties for potential primary and secondary exposure while preferentially sequestering
agent.
It is also clear that many remediation technologies are speciﬁcally designed to
convert persistent compounds to nonpersistent hazards. For example, hydrolysis
half-times of the persistent nerve agent VX at alkaline pH range from 2 min to
approximately 3 h; this degradation analysis is provided in Table 4 and plotted in
Figure 6. There is no expectation that long-term exposures would occur with suc-
cessful decontamination of the release, continued CWA and TIC degradation of any
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residual material over time via well-characterized reactions such as hydrolysis, and
site removal of materials that cannot be effectively decontaminated. Thus, consider-
ation of continuous and long-term exposure at some constant source concentration
is not supported.
An accurate assessment of potential residual chemical hazard can be determined
by application of a systematic logic involving consideration of the amount released
as well as nature and extent of release, decontamination reaction chemistry, decon-
tamination methods and procedures, degradation products, media properties and
environmental parameters. These ﬁndings hold true for chemical warfare agents
and toxic industrial compounds. When a persistent compound can be determined
to pose a nonpersistent hazard, or a non-persistent compound is the chemical of
concern, the logical and recommended focus for cleanup activities is to minimize
acute hazards. Further, labor- and resource-intensive decontamination processes
should be reserved for persistent chemical hazards only.
This logic is consistent with existing assessments developed by California Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency to guide remediation of former clandestine metham-
phetamine production facilities, often characterized by hazardous levels of metham-
phetamine surface residues (and potential off-gas) posing a public health clean-up
challenge (Salocks 2009).
While developed for a speciﬁc release scenario at a major airport, the logic and
approaches presented for the nine threat compounds evaluated have merit for pre-
planning clearance goal development when considering other transportation hubs
and chemicals of concern.
The following article (Part II in this series; “Developing Health-Based Pre-
Planning Clearance Goals for Airport Terminal Remediation Following a Chemi-
cal Terrorist Attack: Decision Criteria for Multipathway Exposures”) incorporates
the above ﬁndings as crucial components in developing speciﬁc decision criteria
for multiple and likely exposure routes following chemical terrorist attack in a ma-
jor airport. Models and ﬁrst-time, open-literature documentation of multi-pathway,
health-based remediation exposure guidelines for CWAs and TICs (and their degra-
dationproducts)arepresentedforpre-planningapplicationsandtofacilitateairport
remediation following such an attack.
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ABBREVIATIONS
AC hydrogen cyanide; NATO code
ACGIH American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists
AEGLs Acute Exposure Guideline Levels
AIHA American Industrial Hygiene Association
ASTM American Society for Testing and Material, International
ATSDR Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry of the DHHS
CAM Center for Airport Management
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of the DHHS
CG phosgene; NATO code
CK cyanogen chloride; NATO code
CMA U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency
CNS central nervous system
COPC Contaminants of Potential Concern
COT Committee on Toxicology of the National Research Council
CSEPP Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program; joint
FEMA/DA organization
CSM conceptual site model
CWA chemical warfare agent
DA U.S. Department of the Army
DABT Diplomate, American Board of Toxicology
DDESB Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board
DHHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DNA deoxyribonucleic acid
DOE U.S. Department of Energy
EA2192 S-(diisopropylaminoethyl) methylphosphonothioic acid,
C9H22NPO2S
ECBC Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
EMPA ethyl methylphosphonic acid
EOC Emergency Operations Center
ERSHDB Emergency Response Safety and health Database of the NIOSH
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency of the USDHS
GA nerve agent tabun; NATO code
GB nerve agent sarin; NATO code
GD nerve agent soman; NATO code
GF nerve agent cyclosarin; NATO code
GPL general population limit
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HD vesicant agent distilled sulfur mustard; NATO code
HSDB Hazardous Substances Data Bank
HVAC heating, ventilating and air conditioning
IDLH immediately dangerous to life or health
IMAAC Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center
IMPA isopropyl methylphosphoni c acid
IOM Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences
IRIS Integrated Risk Information System of the USEPA
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos NM
LAWA Los Angeles World Airports
LAX Los Angeles International Airport
LD50 median Lethal Dose
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore CA
MCE maximum credible event
MPA methyl phosphonic acid; CH5O3P
NARAC National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEP National Exercise Program
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NRC National Research Council
NSSE National Special Security Events
OASA Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary of the Army
OEHHA Ofﬁce of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment of the CalEPA
OPPTS Ofﬁce of Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances of the USEPA
ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge TN
PNNL Paciﬁc Northwest National Laboratory, Richland WA
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
RMP risk management plan
RNA ribonucleic acid
RSLs Regional Screening Levels of the USEPA
SC South Carolina
SNL Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque NM
SRCL surface removal contaminant levels
STEL short-term exposure limit
SVFUDS Spring Valley Formerly Used Defense Site
TBIT TheBradleyInternationalTerminaloftheLosAngelesInternational
Airport
TDG thiodiglycol
TICs toxic industrial compounds
USACHPPM U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine
USEPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
VX nerve agent; NATO code
WPL worker population limit
WWI World War I
WWII World War II
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